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Measuring social capital: Culture as an
explanation of Italy’s economic dualism
FRANCESCO L. GALASSI
Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV AL, UK
This article presents a quantitative test of the oft-repeated view that
Italy’s backward and poor South suffered from low ‘social capital’, a
tendency to defect from co-operative engagements. The problem with
such assertions is that they run the risk of taking as evidence in favour of
the hypothesis the very observations that need to be explained. The
analysis carried out in this work tries to break out of this impasse by
analysing the conditions under which it was ex ante welfare-improving for
farmers in early twentieth century Italy to join an unlimited liability rural
co-operative bank which would give them access to cheaper credit, but
also exposed them to the risk of their neighbours’ defection. These ‘co-
ops’ are a prime testing ground for the cultural explanation in that they
spread rapidly throughout Northern Italy in the late nineteenth century,
but never gained a similar popularity in the South. I estimate the
switching function for these co-ops in different parts of the country to test
whether Northern and Southern farmers faced significantly different
choice sets when making the decision to join. Identical choice sets but
differential responses would of course favour the cultural explanation of
the South’s backwardness. The results suggest that for the same
parameter values, the choice sets for North and South were indeed
different.
Economists have increasingly recognised that high social capital, under-
stood as sustained group-level co-operative behaviour, constitutes an essen-
tial lubricant to economic and political systems (Arrow , Coleman
, Glaeser et al. ). In particular, Dasgupta () has argued that
the foundation of social capital, trust, depends on credible sanctions and
correct incentives. Since observable behaviour may be motivated by oppor-
tunism or strategic considerations, trust derives from knowledge of others’
awareness that future benefits depend upon current honesty, or on efficient
enforcement mechanisms. Social capital is thus cumulative and shares some
of the characteristics of public goods, in that it has extensive externalities
and does not diminish with use – in fact, it may increase. In addition, trust
implies unobservability in a complex world. Unobservability and complex-
ity mean that individuals routinely come into contact with others about
whom they have limited or no information but whose co-operation must be
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engaged. Reliance on third-party enforcement may play a role, but it hardly
needs stressing that enlisting this help is not costless. It follows that besides
being cumulative, social capital is also general, meaning that for it to work
effectively (that is, to solve multiple prisoner’s dilemmas), there has to be a
‘culture of trust’. This may sound disturbingly woolly, so it has to be given
analytical incisiveness. A culture of trust exists when the overwhelming
majority of players expect that, in the overwhelming majority of transac-
tions, other parties whose behaviour cannot be fully monitored will not
defect, that is, will not seek to seize a greater-than-agreed share of the
cumulative benefits. A culture of trust is a systemic bias in favour of co-
operative resolutions to multiple prisoner’s dilemmas.
Low social capital is often blamed for economic backwardness, as is wit-
nessed by the stress currently laid by international development agencies on
fighting corruption. In this view, a culture of trust is an essential component
of what Abramovitz () has called the ‘social capability’ underlying con-
vergence. The point is intuitively appealing, since it seems reasonable that
productive investment, which involves trading current claims upon
resources for future claims contingent upon third party behaviour, will be
discouraged where income streams are insecure, and empirical research
(Mauro ) confirms this. Arguing in this vein, Putnam (), drawing
on earlier work by Banfield (), suggested that Italy’s underdeveloped
South was plagued by a lack of ‘civil culture’. The argument, supported 
in part by A’Hearn (), is that Southern Italians never overcame 
their reciprocal mistrust in order to produce networks of mutual engage-
ment, so that incentives to defect were never reduced by social sanctions.
The equilibrium was disastrous but stable, in that the dominant strategy
was to avoid engagement outside narrowly restricted circles where effective
sanctions and reciprocity operated, that is, in practice, within the family
(Sinisi , Basu ). ‘When your neighbour’s house is on fire’, admon-
ishes a Southern Italian proverb, ‘bring water to your own’. One conse-
quence of this may have been the very backwardness of the area: in the early
twentieth century, the South’s per capita output was barely three-quarters of
the national average and its personal income one half of the industrial
North’s (Zamagni , p. ). Literacy, infant mortality, life expectancy,
or any other index told the same story, and the situation is not too different
today.
The approach is challenging, and this article offers a test for the ‘culture-
of-trust’ explanation of Southern backwardness. At this stage, proving that
low trust hurt the South’s development chances is not possible. I will
instead focus on whether there is evidence of significantly different levels 
of trust in Northern and Southern Italy by calculating a measure of the 
trust Southern Italians had for one another using a form of revealed prefer-
ence approach. Specifically, I will model their decision to join a rural 
co-operative bank (cassa rurale) in the early years of the twentieth century,
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a period when these banks were spreading rapidly in the rest of the country,
though they remained few in the South. These banks, modelled on the
Raiffeisen co-ops, are a prime testing ground for any claim about social cap-
ital because members accepted, by law, unlimited liability for the co-op’s
debts. Indeed, low social capital is central to Guinnane’s () account of
why these institutions failed in Ireland. Against the benefit of borrowing at
lower rates than those of the village moneylender (‘formal’ banks were
noticeable for their absence from Italy’s rural areas before the interwar
years: Muzzioli ), farmers had to weigh the possibility of being ruined
by their neighbours’ defections. By and large, Northern Italians felt this was
a gamble worth taking, and joined. Southerners did not. Does this mean
that Southerners trusted one another less than their Northern cousins? Or
were other constraints affecting their different response?
The ‘low social capital’ approach to the South is, of course, wider than
the test I can carry out in this article. Banfield and Putnam are, after all,
referring to problems of co-operation in society at large, that is, to the pres-
ence of diffused and generalised trust. All I can do is focus on a specific
decision (whether to join a co-operative), and that decision is not per se
unambiguously indicative of diffused trust in society. However, framing the
question of trust in these narrow terms is convenient for two reasons. In the
first place, the payoff matrix is well defined. Attempts to measure trust at a
more diffuse level encounter a number of specification and computational
problems dictated by the complexity of the relationships under scrutiny. In
this case, on the other hand, the ex ante benefits accruing to prospective
members are rather more clearly identifiable, which allows me to study
whether Southern Italians refused to work with co-operatives even though
this would have been welfare-improving. Secondly, the differential success
of co-ops in the North and in the South is sufficiently striking to suggest that
some systemic force may have been at work. At the very least, then, the
article offers a specific test of a wider hypothesis.
In the next section I will sketch a brief history of rural co-operative
lenders in Italy, and set the stage for the test presented later in the article.
Section  will introduce a simple framework to model ‘trust’ in this context,
and section  will use official data to compare the revealed degrees of trust
farmers in Northern and Southern Italy felt for their neighbours.
. Rural credit co-operatives in Italy, –
The salient facts relating to rural co-operative credit in Italy are easily
stated. The first (non-denominational) cassa rurale was founded in June
 near Padua with a membership of . By December  over ,
farmers had joined similar co-ops, and loans financed by these banks had
grown in real terms by more than , per cent (Agostini , p. ;
Zalin , p. ). In the s, a number of Catholic credit co-ops were
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also organised thanks to the initiative of parish priests spurred by the
Vatican’s ideological relaxation signalled by the encyclical Rerum Novarum
of  (Preziosi ). The capillary organisation of the Church helped in
the diffusion of these experiments, and the involvement of the clergy acted
as a kind of guarantee of probity. Only seven years after the founding of the
first Catholic cassa (August ), Catholic co-operatives in Italy numbered
almost  and loans financed by them went from less than , 
lire per year to over ,, (Cooperazione  November , p. ;
Tramontin ; Tamagnini , p. ). While no census of co-ops was
ever taken before the interwar years, it appears that by December ,
some , casse rurali existed in Italy, with a total membership of ,
(Tamagnini , p. ). The evidence, limited though it is, also strongly
suggests that rapid growth was not bought at the expense of solvency: few
casse ever failed and borrowers seldom defaulted (Tamagnini , p. ;
Bresolin , p. ).
This success is all the more remarkable because there were good reasons
to expect that few people would join. Legally, a credit co-operative was con-
stituted when no less than three individuals signed the articles of incorpo-
ration, the main feature of which was that members were ‘jointly and
severally responsible with all their property’ for the co-op’s liabilities. 
Co-operatives raised funds either by accepting deposits from the public, or
by obtaining backing from larger financial institutions in the form of a loan
note secured on the property of members. Lending was almost exclusively
short term ( year) and was restricted to members. In addition, shares were
not tradable, no dividends could be distributed, and each member only had
one vote regardless of the number of shares held. Finally, the co-op required
a commitment of time and effort, which by law could not be remunerated.
In spite of the risks and drawbacks associated with these legal require-
ments, the co-ops soon attracted a large membership. While the back-
grounds of members have not yet been analysed in detail, some data from
the late s give the following cross-section: in , . per cent of co-
op members were small landowners; . per cent fixed rent tenants or
sharecroppers; . per cent artisans, shopkeepers or small merchants;  per
cent farm hands. In the same year, . per cent of co-op loans by value
were used to buy livestock; . per cent financed trade or small scale
manufacturing; . per cent were used to purchase fertilisers, herbicides,
or fungicides: . per cent went into land improvement; . per cent to
buy food; . per cent to buy fodder; . per cent financed seasonal
migrants; and . per cent to buy farm tools (Caputo , pp. –).
These data are interesting, if vague. It is not clear, for example, what is
meant by ‘small landowner’ or ‘small scale manufacturing’, yet the flavour
of the information points to localised micro-credit. This is confirmed by one
of the few instances of recorded collateral accepted by a cassa, the one in
Treviglio ( km east of Milan). From  March to  September , this
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co-op extended credit on the security of cattle ( heads in  loans),
horses ( in  loans), donkeys ( in  loans), carts ( in  loans), and
even a borrower’s garlic crop (Treviglio ). At this level of micro-credit,
the advantages offered by co-ops to small borrowers are well known and
need not detain us here (Besley et al. , Banerjee et al. , Besley and
Coate, ).
The portfolio of the casse appears to have consisted mostly of loans,
secured and unsecured, and deposits with larger banks. Only very occasion-
ally did they invest in government or commercial paper: each of these
accounted for less than  per cent of assets in  (Ruggieri ).
Important regional differences existed, however, in their liabilities, which
were mostly current and savings accounts in Northern Italy (less commonly
term or time deposits), while they included a significant portion of loans
from banks of issue in the South, particularly in Sicily (Sannucci , Polsi
).
The casse’s local character was never compensated by a strong federal
structure, unlike the Raiffeisen banks in Germany or the Crédit Agricole in
France (Gueslin ). At a reasonably early stage, interbank lending
appeared as co-ops that had grown faster than others acted both as clearing
houses and as providers of discount facilities (Ristorto , p. ;
Lanzavecchia , p. ; Bermond , pp. –). In most cases, how-
ever, the local savings banks, which were predominantly urban, acted in the
secondary market for co-ops (Veneruso , pp. –; Saguatti , pp.
–; Cafaro , pp. –). While a number of federations of casse
rurali were founded from the mid-s onward, they were almost always
local affairs, at times consisting of no more than half a dozen co-ops. These
organisations never became large enough to act as discounters or lenders of
last resort for the casse, which, outside of a few privileged areas such as
Sicily, did not have easy access to the banks of issue for liquidity. Several
national conventions resolved to set up a nationwide bank to provide better
rediscount and secondary market facilities, but in practice fewer than  per
cent of existing casse ever bothered to join (Cafaro , pp. –). In fact,
the casse were either actively opposed to, or at least suspicious of, wider
groups, precisely because their strong local character made them uneasy
with organisations based in other parts of the country (Cooperazione 
October ; Pessina , pp. –; Di Taranto , p. ; Lo
Giudice  pp. –). This disintegrated structure and the extreme
reliance of the co-ops on the local economy did not cause important liquid-
ity problems in the years before the First World War. The  financial
crisis did bring about a decline in the number of co-ops, but only because
some failed as a result of losses suffered when larger financial institutions
closed their doors (Bonelli ). In any event, the loss in numbers was
made up reasonably quickly. However, except for , when their financial
support simply vanished, failures were rare among co-ops (Cafaro , 
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p. ), and those that did occur appear to be related to individual misman-
agement or, more rarely, fraud (Pretelli ; Gallo , p. ). The
inflationary experience of the war years changed this situation dramatically.
The fragmented structure of co-operative credit in post-First World War
Italy meant that as a rule co-ops used a few larger intermediaries (at times
only one) as providers of rediscount facilities or as placement for excess liq-
uidity. Wartime inflation and rationing from  onwards brought about a
rapid rise in the casse’s liabilities, the proceeds from which were often simply
placed on term with larger local banks with which co-ops already had long-
standing relationships. In fact, what the co-ops lacked was a diversified
investment strategy, which left them open to important, often critical, losses
when the larger institutions found themselves in difficulties in the postwar
deflation (Caroleo ; Zamagni , p. ). The early s saw a
sharp decline in the number of casse, partially masked in the official data by
the high number of co-ops located in the territories gained by Italy with the
Treaty of Versailles (Bof ; Cafaro , p. ; Leonardi ).
The financial difficulties of many casse in the early to mid-s gave the
Fascist régime the excuse to intervene, bringing them under direct super-
vision by the Ministry of Finance and the central bank, forcing a number of
mergers, and setting up a federal structure. The casse were thereby removed
from the influence of the Catholic clergy and brought under the control of
the Fascist party (Roggi , pp. –; Caroleo ; Caputo , pp.
–). From that point on, the casse lost their purely rural character, as a
number of legislative measures merged them with urban co-operative and
mutual aid societies, forming larger bodies whose operations were still geo-
graphically restricted, though on a somewhat wider scale than before. The
effect of these reforms was to reduce the number of banking co-operatives.
The s depression, though less acute in Italy than elsewhere (Mattesini
and Quintieri ), further weakened their position. The , casse active
in  had by  declined to , (–. per cent), while total liabili-
ties fell by . per cent in the same period, and the value of their portfolio
declined by over two-thirds (Caputo , p. ). In fact, it was only with
the Italian ‘economic miracle’ in the s that co-operative banks experi-
enced renewed growth (Gigliobianco ).
If these were the broad national trends, regionally the co-ops underwent
widely varied experiences. In Northern Italy (the  provinces constituting
the regions of Piedmont, Liguria, Lombardy, Venetia, Emilia) their growth
was extremely rapid, and the area came to have a disproportionate number
of casse. The only region outside the North where co-ops were common 
was Sicily which, with  per cent of Italy’s farm labour force, accounted for
. per cent of credit co-ops in . Excluding Northern Italy and the
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 A province in Italy is an administrative subdivision corresponding to the British County.
At this time, regions consisted of up to eight provinces.
anomaly of Sicily, the rest of the country had fully half the farm labour force
but fewer than  per cent of all co-operative lenders, and only . per cent
of their assets (Caputo , p. ; Galassi and Cohen , p. ). The
casse thus mirrored the North-South gradient that characterises the Italian
economy.
Sicily had a high concentration of rural co-op lenders, which made it an
anomaly in the North-South gap. The Bank of Sicily, which was a bank of
issue, subsidised co-operative banks in rural areas by assisting in setting
them up and extending credit over the years (Lorenzoni ; La Loggia
, pp. ff; Lo Giudice ; Muzzioli , pp. –). In most cases,
however, these co-ops remained dependent on loans from the bank of issue
for capital, and only a few developed into active financial intermediaries of
their own (Lo Giudice ).
The following table reports summary statistics to illustrate the situation
at the end of  (the choice of year is determined by the availability data
from the agricultural census of : see Cohen and Galassi , and
Galassi ). Part of the issue here is how to define North and South. I am
including in the Centre-South some regions that are traditionally seen as
closer to Northern levels, such as Tuscany, exclusively because they also
had few co-ops.
The data show, first, that in the South farmers were less likely to join, and
co-ops were smaller and poorer, than in Northern Italy. However, the gap
varies. While Northern co-ops were on average . times more numerous
and  times richer than Southern co-ops when standardised by the provin-
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Table . Summary statistics of rural co-operative banks in Italy on 
December , by region, weighted averages of provincial means.
Areas Rural co-op Rural co-op Assets per Rural co-op 
banks per assets per rural co-op assets per 
, farm farm worker bank , lire of 
workers (current lire) (current lire) savings bank 
assets
Northa (n  ) . . , . 
(s.d.  .) (s.d.  .) (s.d.  ,) (s.d.  .)
Centre/Southb . . , . .
(n  ) (s.d.  .) (s.d.  .) (s.d.  ,) (s.d.  .)
Centre/South . . , . 
excluding Sicily (s.d.  .) (s.d.  .) (s.d.  ,) (s.d.  .)
(n  )
Notes: (n)  Number of provinces. a Regions: Piedmont, Liguria, Lombardy, Venetia,
Emilia; b Regions: Tuscany, Umbria, Latium, Marche, Campania, Abbruzzi, Apulia,
Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily, and Sardinia.
Sources: MAIC , ; Galassi and Cohen ; Galassi .
cial labour force, they were only about twice as rich on a bank-by-bank
basis. Secondly, while the means are significantly different in three of the
four columns, in all columns Northern data are markedly more clustered
than Southern data. Finally, Northern co-ops do not seem markedly more
adept at attracting savings deposits than Southern co-ops.
In principle, the North-South differences in the first two columns of
Table  (and to a smaller degree in the third) may reflect some variable
other than differential ‘civic culture’. What are the possible candidates? The
difficulty here is that, since most socio-economic indicators in Italy present
some form of North-South gradient, quantitative tests might well produce
seemingly solid but actually spurious correlations. The process of elimin-
ation must therefore rely on inductive reasoning. There appear to be fun-
damentally two possible reasons (other than ‘civic culture’) why the casse
were more common and prosperous in the North. In the first place, the gap
might reflect differing labour productivity in the two areas. Poorer workers
save less and may need fewer deposit facilities. Secondly, the gap may
reflect the agrarian structure. Since casse membership seems to have been
fundamentally drawn from among the small landowners, if Southern agri-
culture was dominated by latifundia farmed with wage-workers it would not
be surprising that the casse performed less convincingly there. Are there
reasons to believe that either factor is the source of the gap?
The answer is, no. First, the productivity gap. As a crude but effective
way of testing whether this is the source of the differences in Table , the
correlation coefficient between co-op assets per worker, number of casse,
and labour productivity in agriculture by province (Cohen and Galassi 
for methodology) is reported in Table .
When these coefficients are positive, they are also strikingly small. In one
case, the relation is actually negative, though very weak. This is not sur-
prising: rural co-ops were particularly common in North-Eastern Italy,
where output per worker was low (Cohen and Galassi ). In any event,
there was evidently something other than the productivity gap at work.
Could then landownership structures account for the differences? The
 Census reports that . per cent of Southern farm workers aged ten
and over were wage earners and . per cent were owner-operators, as
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 The fourth column of the table does not include post office accounts, because there are
methodological difficulties in these data as it makes little sense to compare bank assets
with savings accounts, which is what the post office data report. A direct comparison of
savings accounts in both banks and the post office is made impossible by the way in
which the Ministry published the bank data, reporting different kinds of deposits
together. However, it has to be noted that post office savings deposits were higher in
Northern Italy than in the South, so that by excluding them I am in fact overestimating
the share of the savings market the co-ops had in the North by a greater margin than
elsewhere. The relative ability to attract savings of Southern co-ops is therefore under-
represented.
opposed to . per cent and . per cent in the North (MAIC ). Even
accepting these figures at face value, the gap in the relative incidence of
owner operators is simply not large enough to account for the differences
outlined in Table . Northern owner operators were just over twice as fre-
quent as Southern owners, while the gap in the incidence of co-ops per farm
worker is in the order of . to . times greater in the North. Furthermore,
there are good reasons to believe that the  census greatly underesti-
mated the number of farm owners in the South (Galassi and Cohen ).
Finally, even in those areas in the North where landownership was concen-
trated (the region of Piedmont), there were  to  casse per , farm
workers, a figure rarely attained in the South.
One way to interpret these facts is that in the South there was a co-ordi-
nation failure in the initial set up of these co-ops: once a cassa was in oper-
ation and demonstrated its reliability, depositors came forth in the South as
much as in the North. The stumbling block was finding people willing to
sign the original incorporation and manage the co-op in the early stages of
its existence. Is there other evidence to support this interpretation?
Some telling information does in fact exist. In the s, a number of
Catholic newspapers, observing the growing gap between the diffusion of
rural co-ops in different areas, suggested setting up a number of ‘demon-
stration’ co-ops in Southern Italy. Their incorporation would last for only
one year, at the end of which the co-op would be dissolved and any assets
distributed among members. It was hoped that this would convince people
of the workability of the idea and so they would join ‘real’ co-ops (Tosti
, p. ). The idea was never tried out because of the high set-up costs
associated with incorporation, yet the very fact that this proposal was made
is consistent with my interpretation of Tables  and .
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Table . Correlation coefficients between provincial output per farm
worker and numbers and assets of rural co-operative banks in Italy, .
Range Correlation coefficient Correlation coefficient 
between number of between rural co-operative 
rural co-operative banks bank assets and output 
and output per farm per farm worker, by 
worker, by province province
All of Italy (n  ) . .
Italy exc. Sicily (n  ) . .
Sources: MAIC , ; Cohen and Galassi ; Galassi and Cohen ; Galassi
.
 In an example of bureaucratic insanity, the articles of incorporation had to be registered
with each of four different government offices and published in three different official
bulletins, all at the signatories’ expense. The process took months.
Other evidence also confirms that the co-ops’ poor showing in the South
stemmed from the initial co-ordination problem. In  one of the first
Catholic casse in Southern Italy completed its first year of operation. In 
their report, the managers thought the experience ‘highly satisfactory . . .
considering local conditions, [people being] still unfamiliar with the func-
tioning of these institutions, still in the grip of mistrust, while at the same
time [there is] a great fear after so many bankruptcies, so many frauds, suf-
fered at the hands of dishonest folks’ (Di Taranto , p. ).
Final confirmation of this diffidence should emerge from interest rate data,
if they were available, which unfortunately they are not in a systematic way.
Some scanty information exists, however, and it is consistent with the idea
that these co-ops operated in Southern Italy in a climate of suspicion. Cerruti
() complained that the cost of raising funds in the province of Rome was
so high that local casse were compelled to charge ‘ per cent and more’ to
remain solvent. Elsewhere in the South, it was difficult to find people who
both possessed the skills to manage an undertaking of this sort and at the
same time enjoyed the trust of the community. In many areas it was believed
that the managers of a co-op would run it for their personal advantage, either
to enrich themselves and their families, or as a step to further a political career
(Di Taranto , pp. –; Rossi , pp. –; Gallo , pp. –).
Such suspicions just do not appear to have surfaced in the North. Does
this difference reflect what Banfield () called ‘amoral familism’, the
idea that the basic organisational criterion of the Italian South was loyalty
to one’s family, and Putnam () has recently argued was a ‘lack of civil
culture’ in Southern Italy? The co-ops would, in this perspective, be yet
another victim of low social capital. Lacking credible mutual engagements,
Southerners expected others to defect. Given the cost of others’ defection,
the prudent Southerner stayed clear of the co-ops.
Appealing though this answer is, one may legitimately ask whether its
analytical content is in the end as incisive as it appears. Is ‘amoral familism’
or ‘low trust’ really more than a description of the phenomenon under a dif-
ferent guise? There is, after all, a reasonable alternative to this cultural
explanation. It may be that the net benefits one could expect from joining a
co-op were smaller in Southern Italy. The gap highlighted in Table  would
then reflect not a lower propensity to engage in co-operative games but the
smaller payoffs available from the games themselves. Whether or not this
hypothesis is generally true for Southern Italy (or other ‘low trust’ societies)
cannot be answered in this article. All I intend to show in the next two sec-
tions is that joining one of these co-ops was not equally rewarding every-
where. To do this, I need to estimate and compare the switching function
where joining became attractive in the South and in the North.
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 The bankruptcies referred to are those of the  financial crisis, which did not involve
co-ops.
. To join or not to join: a simple model
This section models the decision to join a co-operative lender of the kind
described above. I am not concerned here with the design of the co-opera-
tive, its policies or investment decisions (Braverman and Guasch ;
Banerjee et al. ). Rather I am trying to establish under what circum-
stance a rational decision-maker would ‘switch’ from not joining to joining,
and thereby gain access to cheaper credit but also accept the risk of defec-
tion by other members, which would rebound against them because of the
unlimited liability clause. This will allow me to define a switching locus in
relation to ‘trust,’ which can be estimated for the casse rurali in different
parts of Italy in  (Section ).
Assume that capital is discontinuous, and that a representative individual
has an investment project costing x with probability  of yielding  and (
 ) of yielding . This individual has net wealth w, assumed to be in fixed
assets complementary to the inputs that have to be purchased with x to
carry out the investment, such that w  x. This, plus the usual assumptions
about asymmetric information and unobservability, means that the individ-
ual will find it difficult, and probably impossible, to obtain credit in the
‘formal’ market. A local moneylender, with informational advantages
unavailable to ‘formal’ lenders (Galassi ), is willing to finance the proj-
ect at interest rate rl. The potential borrower has to choose between this
form of financing, and joining a cooperative of m members. At any one time,
n (m) members borrow from the co-op, so that a credit note is issued on
the market for the amount X (nx). Each member pays the same interest
rate i. The co-op raises X by offering a competitive interest rate r. I assume
that the co-op is not a profit maximiser, but that it will choose the lowest
possible i consistent with meeting its obligations (repay (  r)X at matu-
rity: Galassi ). This in effect means that the co-op must ex ante set what
it expects to receive from its borrowing members to be at least equal to its
obligations in the capital market. Using  to indicate the proportion of m
who are expected to repay their loans, this means that
(  i)X  (  r)X  A ()
where A indicates the change in amount of reserves the co-op will hold at
the end of the period. Note that  is now indicating the probability of the
average investment project paying off. If, ex post, (  i)	(  r)  A/X,
the difference is assumed to become part of reserves A. If, on the other
hand, receipts turn out to be lower than commitments, the co-op is
assumed to reduce first reserves and then, once A  , to call upon the
assets of members to make up the shortfall. Hence:
Measuring social capital in Italy 
 Probability  is assumed to be exogenous, that is, not affected by agent’s efforts or skill.
 One way to think about this is that the investor owns land and some tools, but has no
capital to finance an irrigation project or the purchase of a machine.
()
Two points need to be emphasised here. The first is that A/X is an
endogenous ratio because, once i is set, the ex post values of  and  will
determine A. Ex ante, the co-op can ‘aim’ for a particular value of A/X by
choosing i. It then seems reasonable to expect that co-ops that operated in
areas where they had difficulty attracting funds (that is, r was high) would
try to aim for as low an A/X ratio (that is, choose as low an i) as possible.
This is borne out by the data (Section ).
The second point is that I am somewhat artificially separating  and .
In reality, of course, the two are difficult to distinguish, in that borrowers
may behave strategically by applying less diligence to a project than would
be desirable from the lender’s viewpoint (Stiglitz and Weiss ). More
generally, the co-op’s return is assumed to be unrelated to the interest rate
it charges. This is of course a simplification, but it should not affect the
results discussed in Section  provided that interest rates charged by co-ops
did not differentially affect realised returns in different parts of the country.
In any event, as I outlined earlier, the evidence is that defaults by members
were extremely rare, so that if there was strategic behaviour in this sense it
appears to have been quantitatively insignificant.
In a complete model, a borrower wishing to join a co-op offering loans at
i would have to invest resources into acquiring a positive reputation
(Dasgupta ). In this simple framework, however, I treat reputation as
given, and focus instead on whether an individual would find joining to be
an attractive proposition. This individual will evaluate the net benefit (B) of
joining by setting the reduction in borrowing costs against, first, the value
of inputs which will have to be provided free to the co-op, and, second,
against the probability of default by other co-op members. Using 
 for the
value of inputs a member will have to devote to the co-op and s for his/her
share of any defaulting members’ repayment, B can be written as
B  (i  rl)x  
  s ()
where:
s  . ()
Substituting () and () into () and setting B yields
       . ()
This quadratic form defines a locus in [, ] space along which a rational
actor will switch from wishing to remain outside the co-op and incur high
m

n
  r  X

  rl  x
m

n
(  )nx(  i)

m  (  )n
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borrowing costs to wishing to join. Solving for , and noting that only the
positive root is of interest in this context, yields
       
(B  )  ()
This solution is important and warrants some discussion. In effect, ()
represents the minimum proportion of co-op members whom an individual
must trust in order to be strictly indifferent ex ante between joining and not
joining. I will denote this by *. For any , if  	 *, the individual is ex
ante unequivocally better off by becoming a member. Note that * is a
decreasing hyperbolic function of , the exogenous probability that the
‘average’ investment project will actually pay off. This is reasonable, as the
riskier the natural environment is (recall the casse were rural lenders), the
greater the trust in other co-op members must be in order to find joining
attractive. However, while the hyperbole is defined by , its actual position
in [, ] space is affected by ‘structural’ variables: the m/n ratio, relative
interest rates (rl and r), the cost of resources devoted by members to co-op
affairs relative to loan size (
/x), the co-op’s ratio of assets to loans (A/X).
The combinations of [, ] which result in  	 * I will call the ‘feasible set’
and denote by F.
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Figure . The feasible sets in [, ] space.
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The diagram illustrates different feasible sets. For an individual facing
combination F with *, becoming a member of the co-op is welfare-
improving ex ante, and participation will be attractive. If, however, what I
am calling structural factors (changing relative interest rates, or increased
demands on co-op members’ resources) shift the switching locus to *, F
will drop out of F, while combination F will still be inside. The point is that
joining a cassa was not unambiguously desirable: membership paid ex ante
only for some parameter values.
The attractiveness of this formulation, simple though it is, is that it allows
me to test the cultural explanation for varying responsiveness of Italian
farmers to the casse rurali, and therefore, by implication, the Banfield-
Putnam ‘low social capital’ view of Italy’s poor South. I argued in Section
, and elsewhere (Galassi ), that the problem in the South was that
farmers were not willing to join, though if a co-op could get on its feet it was
by most standards successful. The test therefore hinges on defining the ex
ante size of feasible sets for farmers in Northern (Fn) and Southern (Fs)
Italy. There are two possibilities. First, if Fn 	 FS, the low success rate of
Southern casse rurali may be the result of fewer feasible combinations exist-
ing in the South than in the North because of structural factors. This would
cast serious doubt on the cultural explanation. Of course it may be that Fs
is smaller than Fn by a factor greater than the gap in the relevant parameter
of comparison. For example, the North’s feasible set could be twice as big
as the South’s but the North might have more than twice as many casse. In
this case, farmers in the South faced more stringent constraints than their
Northern compatriots, but may still be said not to have made the best of
existing opportunities for co-operative behaviour, which would point to a
modified cultural explanation. If, on the other hand, Fn  Fs, the impli-
cation would be that Southern farmers failed to take advantage of the same
(or greater) opportunities than their Northern cousins. This would provide
support for the cultural explanation.
The idea underpinning this view is that the greater is F, the greater the
probability of a co-op being set up. This does not mean that at a particular
time and space all possible combinations implied in a given F will have been
exploited. There is, in other words, no reason to deduce optimality from
particular observed outcomes, even if such a concept could be unambigu-
ously defined in this case. The point is simply relative performance: given
the North as a benchmark, did the South behave in proportion?
Before proceeding with a numerical test, it is imperative to make clear
what would constitute evidence of equal or different F. I will consider Fn 
Fs if n*  s* for the same value of , because this implies that the position
of hyperbolic function dictated by structural variables is the same in the
North as in the South. If, on the other hand, n*  s* for the same value
of , this will constitute unambiguous evidence that Fn 	 Fs. The interpret-
ation of this result is that Northern casse were more common because it was
 European Review of Economic History
easier in the North to find the correct combination of structural variables to
set up a co-operative. Putting this differently, Northerners could establish a
successful co-op with greater ex ante tolerance for defection than could
Southerners. In this case, culture becomes of doubtful value as an expla-
nation of differential success.
The simple framework outlined in this section has a number of short-
comings. The most important is that the assumptions and specifications
necessary to arrive at a computable formulation of F may affect the actual
results. Measurement error in official data used to compute * also cannot
be ruled out. In addition, actors are depicted as engaging in a once-off
game, no attempt is made to model the decision to defect, and reputational
issues, repetitive interaction, evolutionarily stable solutions, and risk aver-
sion, are among the many issues not brought to the fore here. 
The results outlined below must, therefore, be taken with a great deal 
of care, because while they are indicative and convincing so far as they go,
they are not necessarily free from biases. Equally true, however, is that no
reason is immediately apparent why any possible bias should affect North
and South differentially, and it is on the differences in the outcomes of the
two areas that the contribution of the article rests. The framework does have
one decided advantage, which is that the limited data available for Italian
co-ops at the beginning of the twentieth century permit the estimation of the
feasible set for this kind of institutional arrangement in different parts of the
country. In the next Section I estimate the values of * for different areas in
.
. A measure of trust 
The Credit Inspectorate of the Ministry of Agriculture was responsible for
collecting the balance sheets of casse rurali before the  reforms. The
Inspectorate issued detailed guidelines on the form the return had to take,
and non-filing casse could have their licences suspended. In practice, how-
ever, only about two in three co-ops bothered to send their balance sheets
to the Inspectorate, and many seem never to have sent one, without suffer-
ing any adverse consequence. In addition, those balance sheets that were
sent did not always conform to Ministry guidelines, so data are often incon-
sistent. The Inspectorate published the returns, such as they were, in a bul-
letin (MAIC ), listing the number of casse in existence per province and
the number considered ‘active’ (though there appears to be no clear defi-
nition of what this meant). The same publication also reported balance
sheet highlights, usually the value of capital, reserves, and the amount of
loans and deposits (though not their number). No membership data were
collected.
The Inspectorate’s bulletin for  December  constitutes the source
of data used to estimate *. The choice of date was dictated by the need to
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have observations close to a census (one was taken in June : MAIC
, Galassi and Cohen ) and yet refer to as dormant a time of the
agricultural year as possible to prevent different local farming cycles from
affecting relative values. This in effect leaves only the winter months. While
other dates would have served as well, the number of casse returning their
balance sheets in the early months of  or December  were found to
be considerably fewer than the  out of , ‘active’ ones of late .
Even so, inconsistencies in information provided by the casse mean that for
only  out of  Northern provinces, and  out of  Centre and
Southern ones, can the value of * be computed. Still these  provinces
accounted for  per cent of Italy’s provinces,  per cent of farmland, and
 per cent of farm labour (ISTAT –).
Aside from inconsistencies or gaps in the dataset, two objections may be
raised against using these data to estimate Fn and Fs. In the first place, the
existence of a rural co-operative lender in a Southern province means that
the original co-ordination problem had been solved, at least once. It is then
difficult to see how comparing the F estimated from existing co-ops can give
an insight into why in other areas of the South the co-ordination problem
had not been solved. The very nature of the data may bias the results toward
the (possibly incorrect) finding that Fn  Fs. The weakness in this objection
is that if the economic or natural environment in the South made it less
attractive to join a cassa than in the North, the estimated * should still give
a higher value whether or not co-ordination had been achieved. Putting it
differently, successful co-ordination should not change the size of F. The
link flows the other way: the size of F makes co-ordination more or less easy.
Secondly, and more generally, * is an ex ante value, but of course all I
can estimate is an ex post value, which I will call g*. It may be, first, that
*  g*, in which case my estimation accurately represents this choice faced
by Italian farmers. However, if *  g*, that is if the feasible set was at the
time believed to be greater than it proved to be, some individuals would join
even though they ex post would have benefited from staying out. Lastly, if
* 	 g*, the feasible set was underestimated at the time and individuals did
not join who would have benefited. Because the value of * cannot now be
estimated, how can we be sure that the value of g* is really giving an insight
into the choices faced by these farmers  years ago?
Referring back to equation () above, some variables involved in calcu-
lating * would have been in the public domain, namely the rates charged
by the co-op, r, the rates charged by moneylenders, rl, exogenous risk , and
m, membership in the co-op. Variables that may have been more difficult to
observe were those ‘internal’ to the co-op, that is the number of loans made,
n, the reserve to loan ratio A/X, and the demands made on members’ time,

/x. None of them would have been actually impossible to find if inquiries
were made, however: certainly the reserve deposit ratio was published in the
Ministry bulletin, and the other two could have been gathered by asking
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members of the co-op. The information available was therefore substantially
the same as that which can be collected to-day, except for , which was
assuredly known in a general way to the farmers at the time, while the actual
outcome of the upcoming harvest, known today thanks to official output
data, was unknown at the time. No way around this exists except to esti-
mate g* in the form of ranges of values, calculated by taking into account
other evidence as discussed below.
One last point needs to be made before the actual data are discussed: the
issue at hand is not whether ex ante estimates of * made at the time were
revealed as accurate (that is, whether *  g*). The point is rather whether,
given a reasonable approximation to *, behaviour in Northern and
Southern Italy was consistent with these values. If g* in the South is not sig-
nificantly different from g* in the North, then the differences described in
Table  must be of cultural origin.
Of the variables in equation (), two can be derived directly from
Ministry publications: the reserve/loan ratio (A/X) and the rate co-ops paid
to raise funds (MAIC , ). It is important here to return to the issue
of A, the reserves accumulated by the co-op. As stated in Section , A is
really the change in reserves. However, the variable only enters into the esti-
mation of g* as a ratio (A/X). While the year to year change in reserves can
only be calculated for a handful of co-ops, therefore, what matters is that
the A/X ratio should be accurate, that is, that reserves should change pro-
portionally to loans. In all cases where the year to year change in reserves
can be calculated, the A/X is remarkably constant (varying by less than .
per cent). Thus the ratio is, if not wholly exact, certainly accurate enough.
Data on money market rates paid by the co-ops are available in the Ministry
bulletin that reported data on savings banks by province (MAIC ).
Of the other variables, the probability of the average investment project
financed by a co-op being successful () is more involved, and its estima-
tion is described in detail in the Appendix. Suffice it to say that, as calcu-
lated,  represents the probability that the average farmer in the 
provinces could meet repayment of the estimated average loan at current
interest rates given the (known) riskiness of crops in that area. The problem
with this measure is that it reflects a province-wide risk measure because of
course crop fluctuations on the land farmed by co-op borrowers are not
observable. This may well result in an underestimate of , which however
does not matter to the overall relative results for different areas provided
underestimation does not systematically vary with locality.
The ratio of members to borrowers in each co-op (m/n) is not available,
yet contemporary evidence from Germany suggests that values of . to 
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 In principle I could use the outcome of previous years’ harvests with adjustable weights
to estimate an expected value of . The problem here is that Ministry data do not report
long enough data series prior to  to allow me to do so.
. would be reasonable. Guinnane () found that between  and 
per cent of farmers in two German co-operatives he studied in this period 
took out loans within the first six months of operation, and between  
and  per cent borrowed in the first two years. Virtually the same value
(.) results from the only case I am aware of where both membership 
and borrowers can actually be counted, that of the cassa in Treviglio 
().
The 
/x ratio, resources owned by members but provided free of charge
to the co-op as a fraction of the value of the loan, is simply unknown, and I
have somewhat arbitrarily chosen two values,  and .. The first suggests
that prospective members would not expect to be asked to help run the co-
op in the early stages of their membership. The second is based on the aver-
age loan value derived from MAIC () and Caputo (, p. ). This
gives an estimated average loan of between  and  lire in . If 
/x
is set at ., given that agricultural wages for adult males were . lire/day
at the time (Zamagni , , Table .), this implies that the average
member devoted between seven and ten full days per year to help run the
co-op. This seems a reasonable amount, considering that this time was most
likely spread over several months. Adjusting this estimate upwards, in any
event, makes no difference to the relative standing of co-ops from different
areas.
Finally, data on rl, rates charged by local moneylenders are difficult to
find. While the complaints about ‘usurious’ borrowing costs were wide-
spread at the time (Lorenzoni , Placanica ), actual figures are
scarce. Some evidence, however, suggests that  per cent was a reasonably
typical rate in the South (Lorenzoni , p. ). This rate, which is in line
with current observations from LDC money markets (Gillis et al. , p.
), turns out to be exactly . times the market rate charged by savings
banks in the same area at that time (MAIC ). This opens up two poss-
ible ways of estimating rl province by province. One is simply to adopt the
same  per cent as a national figure in the informal money market. The
other is to use the ratio of the informal rate to the known savings bank dis-
count rates in the same province, and estimate the informal market rate for
each province by multiplying this ratio by local savings bank rates. Because
savings bank rates were lower in the North than in the South, the first
method is more questionable, in that it attributes to local moneylenders in
the North a greater market power than in the South. The second assumes
an equal degree of market power, and is definitely preferable.
Table  reports estimates of g* for the ranges of 
/x [, .]; and m/n
[., .] as discussed. Regional figures have been calculated as follows.
On the basis of [], g* has been estimated using each individual co-op’s A/X
and interest rate, the relevant values for parameters 
/x and m/n, and the
province-wide estimate of . The regional figures were then computed by
weighing each co-op’s g* by its share of assets in the regional total. To avoid
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burdening the article with numbers, the Table only reports minima and
maxima in parameter ranges, omitting intermediate values.
Ignoring the last two rows of the Table for the moment, the first conclu-
sion to be drawn is that the feasible sets seem not to have been the same in
Northern and Southern Italy. With the same parameter values, Southern
estimates of g* are significantly different from the North’s: on average, the
South registers values some ten standard deviations higher than the North’s
mean. Interestingly, however, the opposite is not true: Northern values are
well within one standard deviation from the South’s mean. As in Table ,
Northern values cluster markedly more than Southern ones. Some regions
in the South have ‘Northern’ characteristics, and others are definitely dis-
tinct, especially Abbruzzi, Sicily and Calabria.
These results suggest that it was objectively more difficult to set up a co-
op in Southern Italy, or at least in some Southern regions, than in the
North. Southerners needed to trust a greater proportion of their neighbours
to find that membership was worth the risk, and thus not surprisingly
started fewer co-ops, than their Northern colleagues. The correlation
coefficient between the values of g* in Table  and the number of co-ops
enumerated by the Ministry (MAIC ) varies between –. and –.,
depending on the parameter range. This makes sense: the higher the
estimated switching point for joining, the more difficult it was to solve the
co-ordination problem and organise a co-op.
The source of the North-South difference is intriguing:  values are con-
siderably lower in the South, reflecting the riskier environment. If the aver-
age  for the  Northern provinces is used when estimating g* for the 
Southern ones, as was done in the last two columns of Table , the differ-
ence, for given values of other parameters, disappears entirely. Southerners
had to trust one another more than Northerners not because of ‘structural’
problems, but because they lived in a riskier area. This is interesting,
because it suggests that the Italian capital market was reasonably well inte-
grated in the early twentieth century. Borrowing costs differed (savings bank
rates were on average one percentage point higher in Southern Italy) in all
likelihood precisely because the South, having an economy still closely tied
to the vagaries of weather, faced higher default rates. But it was not just the
cost of capital that made starting a cassa such a difficult undertaking. The
problem was that exogenous risk was higher in Southern Italy.
On closer inspection, however, this interpretation needs to be qualified.
In the first place, the correlation coefficient between g* and the number of
co-ops, while it has the ‘right’ sign, is also rather low. Secondly, if instead
of using the national sample the data are disaggregated to calculate the cor-
relation for the  Northern provinces and the  Southern ones separately,
the Northern coefficient is indistinguishable from  (–.), and the
Southern one is actually positive (.), though weak. This is obviously the
influence of the particular situation in Sicily, but even without that region
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the value falls to ‘only’ –.. Thirdly, inspection of Table  will reveal that
while the values of g* cluster in the North, the number of co-ops reported
by the Ministry varies widely.
Finally, and most importantly, there is no denying that any North-South
differences are small. The gaps are also extremely sensitive to specific par-
ameter values. If Southern co-ops imposed fewer demands on their mem-
bers or financed fewer loans, the gap with the North, even with the higher
 values for the South, tends to disappear. Southern co-ops appear to have
been aware of this: the A/X ratio is lower on average in the Centre-South
than in the North (the lower A/X, the lower is g*). They were, in other
words, trying to make joining as easy as possible. This confirms what has
already been mentioned in Section , that while co-ops seemed to have
trouble starting in the South, they performed as well as those in the North
once they were in place. The obstacle was breaking down initial diffidence.
The reason for that diffidence is therefore the heart of the matter. A cul-
ture of mistrust is the obvious candidate, and the estimates certainly make
it difficult to exclude that out of hand. No discussion of the Italian South is
complete without invoking yet again the centuries of mismanagement at the
hands of various foreign rulers, and the clan-oriented, fractured society that
resulted from subjection to an authority that was perceived as alien and
interested only in extracting rents. But what appears out of the present
analysis is a slightly different picture, one that remains to be confirmed but
is nonetheless potentially just as important as more orthodox historical
accounts. In a risky environment with imperfect information, the uncer-
tainty involved in entering into any co-operative game is compounded 
by the difficulty in determining whether any specific outcome is due to non-
co-operative behaviour on the part of other players or just ‘unlucky’ cir-
cumstances. In these conditions, evolutionarily stable co-operative
behaviour may be difficult to arrive at. All evolutionarily stable strategies,
such as those studied by Nowak and May () and Boyd (), depend
on there being ex post no uncertainty concerning the actions of other players.
Retribution or further co-operation can then be meted out depending upon
whether others have defected. But if defection is difficult to separate from
ill luck, it may be in a player’s interest in the long run not to engage in co-
operative games at all except where information channels are very efficient
and/or repeated engagement on several simultaneous fronts reduces the
probability of defection to very low values. Aside from lowering the odds of
suffering defection by keeping engagement within narrowly confined lines,
a player would also avoid the problem of mistaking ill luck for defection,
and thereby arousing ill-will in other, innocent but unlucky, players, which
may then make future co-operative engagement even more difficult. It
would be hard to find a clearer rationale for Banfield’s ‘amoral familism’.
The link between high exogenous risk and a culture of low trust remains
of course to be proven in theoretical work, and this is not the place to pursue
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it. But what the numerical exercise reported in Table  has shown is that
there was indeed a difference between the choices faced by Southern and
Northern Italians, and that this difference was not, or not wholly, man-
made. To overcome the less predictable environment they lived in,
Southerners had to accept a stricter discipline than their colleagues in
Northern Italy. Whether this was at all possible given the culture that may
have been engendered by that very environment has to remain for the pres-
ent at least a moot point. But the evidence is reasonably clear that they lived
under different objective constraints, and if as a result they adopted strat-
egies that appear in retrospect to have damaged their chance of develop-
ment, invoking ‘culture’ as if it were a ‘first mover’ cannot suffice as an
explanation. Their reaction to the casse rurali strongly suggests that they
faced different opportunities, and these may have done more to shape their
choice set than conventional histories give them credit for.
. Conclusion
The answer to the riddle of the poor South goes well beyond the scope of
this article. Still, the results presented here are challenging. North and
South faced constraints that appear, with the necessary qualifications due to
poor and incomplete data, to have been sufficiently different for
Southerners to be at a disadvantage even if their cultural baggage had been
identical. To make a cassa rurale an attractive proposition, the data suggest
that Southerners had to trust a higher proportion of their neighbours than
their Northern compatriots. This was not uniformly true: there were areas
in the South where the parameters suggest that it would have been as easy
(or difficult) to set up viable co-ops as in the North. Yet the gap is there
overall. At one level this is further evidence that Italy’s underdeveloped area
was not a uniform backward economy, but varied substantially from place
to place, something that contemporary studies on the South have empha-
sised repeatedly (Lumley and Morris ). In a different way, however, the
article opens a research agenda on the economics of persistent backward-
ness whenever this has been explained as the result of cultural factors.
Culture, understood as a set of probabilities favouring a type of outcome
over another, may simply be the adaptation of behaviour and expectations
to objective constraints. If Southern Italians found that the payoffs to co-
operative engagement were subject to a great deal of ‘noise’, it would not be
surprising that they chose to limit co-operation to those social relations in
which noise could more easily be detected. This approach to a low trust
equilibrium does not dispense with the specific historical background of the
Italian South. History, on the contrary, retains its weight, but equally it is
true that other areas in the developed world have been misgoverned for long
periods of their history and have not necessarily ended up in a position such
as the Mezzogiorno. Besides, the very ease with which foreign powers were
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able at different times to take over Southern Italy may itself be a reflection
of the same basic disinclination of Southerners to co-operate in the pro-
vision of a public good (defence). In any event, appealing to the explanatory
power of culture as if it were an immutable given may, in fact, hide more
than it reveals, and may even deflect attention from the logic that underlies
particular attitudes.
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Appendix: Estimation procedure for 
In the framework presented in Section ,  is the probability that an investment
project undertaken with financing from a cassa rurale will succeed ( pay ). As
already noted, this can be extended to the entire loan portfolio of the co-op, so that
 comes to indicate the share of loans that have financed successful projects. While
that is enough for a theoretical framework, empirical analysis requires a clearer
definition of what constitutes ‘success’ in this context. One simple way to define it
is to say that  is the proportion of investment projects financed by a co-op in which
the increase in output generated by the project was at least equal to the interest
payments on the loan. Taking this definition as a base, I develop in this Appendix
an estimation of the value of  for the  Italian provinces in  for which I have
co-op data.
Since the casse at this time seldom financed loans for longer than one year,  has
to be seen as the proportion of investments financed by a co-op in which the
increase in output was at least equal to the interest payments plus principal. While
loans were no doubt rolled over, we have no way of knowing now what the pro-
portion of them was and for what amounts. Taking the position that borrowers had
to repay the full amount in twelve months in effect means that we may be overesti-
mating the repayment burden, thereby calculating a lower  than was the case. If
there is any such bias in the procedure, however, the results suggest that it is
extremely small.
Lack of data on the marginal product of investment projects can be overcome
reasonably easily. Let v be the value of output per unit of land on which the invest-
ment project is carried out, and let v  N(v, v). The increase in output from the
investment project will then be v  v, where   N(, ). Then
  Pr[v  v  (  i ) x]. (A)
This implies that:
  Pr  , (A)
which can be estimated from a normal curve.
This brings the solution closer, in that v and  can be estimated for the sample
areas in the years before the First World War. However, there remains the problem
of x and i, respectively the loan size and the interest rates charged by the co-ops.
(  i ) x  v

v
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For the latter, the evidence is that the casse typically charged . percentage points
above their borrowing costs (Cooperazione  March , p. ; Branzoli-Zappi
and Mazza , p. ; Darling , p. ). This brings the estimated rates
charged on loans to around .–. per cent, consistent with the limited available
evidence (Cerruti ; Darling , p. ).
The estimation of v and v is reasonably straightforward. Ideally the information
on yields would relate to the land tilled by the borrowers themselves and their par-
ticular crop mix. Failing that, it does not seem unwarranted to use province-wide
data to estimate average expected income variance for farmers in a given area. What
we need is to have provincial output, land and price data over a number of years for
as many farm products as possible, so as to construct a meaningful estimate of the
standard deviation of farm income in the  provinces. It turns out that these data
are available only for a handful of products for the years leading up to , namely
wheat, wine, olive oil, corn, and potatoes (ISTAT -, Cohen and Galassi ,
p. , for methodology). Even aside from the problem of excluding all livestock
products, the list is obviously too short, yet these crops together accounted for over
 per cent of the total value added in Italy’s agricultural sector in  (Federico
). A measure of variance derived from this list, if not exhaustively computed,
will at least be broadly indicative. Using qjt to indicate the yield per hectare of the
jth crop in year t, jt its price, jt the share of land devoted to it, and T the number
of years over which the data are available (in this case,  to ), v and v can
be calculated for any given province as
v  	
T
	
j
qjt jt jt (A)
and
v  
 	
T
	
j
 qjt jtjt  	
T
	
j
 qjt jtjt

 (A)
The last variable to be estimated before equation (A) can be computed is x,
loan size. The average loan size used in Section  is of little use here, as it refers to
average loan per member, while the only measure of income variance I can recon-
struct is income per hectare. What has to be done is to relate loans to land tilled by
members. Using the total loan portfolio of the  casse, an average loan/hectare
ratio can be approximated provided that an estimate of borrowers for these co-ops
can be developed. This involves four steps:
() Calculating mean national membership size, and estimating how many people
belonged to the co-ops located in each of the  provinces (this has to be done
province by province, since the output variance data are only available province
by province). National membership is known, but not provincial membership.
However, since Southern casse were smaller in terms of assets per worker (Table
), it is reasonable not to limit the estimation to a national mean membership
figure. I have therefore used two extreme values in the estimate, one which con-
sisted of assuming the same national mean applied in every province, and one
where Northern casse have a membership three times the Southern mean.
() Since not all members were net borrowers at any one time, this number has to
be reduced by the fraction who did not borrow in . As outlined in the text,
this is estimated at between . and ..


T


T


T
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() Since only one person per family could be a member of the co-op, the estimate
of the number of borrowers has to be multiplied by mean number of workers
per family to estimate the total number of farmers who were financed by the
sample co-ops (family size data are from ISTAT ).
() Finally, using the known provincial land/labour ratios, the number of farm
workers benefiting from co-op credit can be used to estimate the number of
hectares over which, in a sense, the credit was extended. Dividing the total loan
portfolio by this estimate will give at least a rough value for x.
There is no need to emphasise the number of strong and weak assumptions
involved in this methodology. The results have to be treated with great care and
must not be seen as anything more than broadly indicative. Even so, what emerges
is interesting.
I report below the actual calculation for two randomly chosen provinces (Forlì
in the North, an area of marshy land and extensive farming, and Catania in the
South, an intensively farmed province), as an example of the procedure. The bias
my methodology is likely to impart to the results is discussed at each stage.
. Membership size and members per province
In  national mean casse membership was  (Tamagnini , p. ; Caputo,
, p. ). If membership was equal in each cassa, this implies that , farmers
belonged to the  co-ops in Forlì; and , to the  in Catania. At the other
extreme, if Northern membership was three times Southern membership per cassa,
Forlì would account for , members and Catania for .
Direction of bias: the values are intended to represent extremes of a likely range,
so no specific bias is introduced here.
. Net borrowers in 
Reducing these totals by a factor of . and . yields:
Table A. Estimated borrowers in selected provinces.
National mean membership Differential membership
Province m/n  . m/n  . m/n  . m/n  .
Forlì    
Catania  ,  
Direction of bias. again, the values are intended to represent extremes of a likely
range, so no specific bias is introduced here.
. Farm workers financed by the sample co-ops
Average family size excluding people under  and over  in  was . in Forlì
and . in Catania. Thus farm workers directly or indirectly financed by co-ops
range from , and , in Forlì, and from  to , in Catania.
Measuring social capital in Italy 
Direction of bias: since family sizes are available only by province, not by sector
of employment, the most likely error here is that urban families, which tend to be
smaller than rural ones, are reducing the estimated number of farmers financed by
the co-ops. While this could introduce a bias (underestimating the number of co-
op financed farmers in more urbanised provinces), as a rule the more rural
Southern provinces have a smaller family size than Northern ones.
. Loans per unit of land farmed by co-op members and their families
Land/labour ratios in  were . ha/worker in Forlì and . in Catania.
Estimates of land farmed by borrowers and their families are reported below.
Table A. Estimated hectares farmed by co-op members in selected
provinces.
National mean membership Differential membership
Province m/n  . m/n  . m/n  . m/n  .
Forlì , ,. ,. ,.
Catania , ,  ,.
From this, using the loans reported by the Ministry (MAIC ), I can estimate
the average credit ‘load’ per hectare of land farmed by co-op members.
Table A. Estimated loans per hectare farmed by co-op members in
selected provinces (current lire).
National mean membership Differential membership
Province m/n  . m/n  . m/n  . m/n  .
Forlì . . . .
Catania . . . .
Direction of bias: if co-op members were richer than the average farmer, land esti-
mates will be too low and loan/land ratios too high. However, there is no reason
why this should affect the two provinces (or generally Northern and Southern
provinces) differentially.
The last step in estimating  is to calculate the probabilities defined by equation
(A), recalling that   (, ). I will just give one for each province, purely for
exposition.
Forlì (Differential membership, m/n  .):
  Pr    pr(  .) → .(.)  ..
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Catania (Differential membership, m/n  .):
  Pr    pr(  .) → 
The estimated value of  for these provinces does not mean that investment proj-
ects in agriculture were riskless, but rather that the likelihood of a farmer being
unable to repay a loan due to a general crop failure was, with these parameters, vir-
tually nil. Interestingly, Catania was one of the few areas in the South with a large
number of flourishing co-ops.
.(.)  .

.
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